具竞争性零售商的闭环供应链微分对策模型

Differential game model in closed-loop supply chain with competing retailers

研究了具竞争性零售商的闭环供应链系统的最优回收控制策略.首先构建了零售商回收的闭环供应链微分对策模型,利用微分对策理论求解模型并得到制造商和零售商的最优控制策略.分析发现:当回收成本系数不那么低时系统存在稳态均衡,仅在一定的最优控制策略下系统收敛到稳态均衡.此时零售商的回收投入和产品回收率随时间推移而增大;而零售商的零售价格随时间推移而减小,产品销售速率随时间推移而增大;制造商的批发价格与转移价格有关:当转移价格较高时,制造商的批发价格随时间推移而增大,反之,制造商的批发价格随时间推移而减小;零售商之间关于产品回收具有"先动"优势.

The optimal control strategies in a closed-loop supply chain with competing retailers are studied. First, the differential game model of a closed-loop supply chain with retailer collecting is established, and the optimal control strategies of the manufacturer and the retailers are resolved by the differential game approach. Some results are found. The Saddle point equilibrium exists only under certain conditions. The collecting investment of the retailer as well as the product return rate increases with time, while the retail prices decrease with time. The demand rate of retailers increase with time. The wholesale price of the manufacturer may increase or decrease with time, depending on the transfer price of the used product. When the transfer price is high, the wholesale price increases with time, on the contrary, the wholesale price decreases with time. The product collecting between the competing retailers has a ＇first-move advantage＇ effect for the retailers.