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官员激励和政府创新偏好对工业创新效率的影响 被引量:9

The Influence on the Innovation Efficiency of Industrial Enterprises Exerted by Incentives for Officials and Government Innovation Preferences
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摘要 由于市场机制的固有缺陷以及创新产出外部性等原因,区域创新系统建设对地方政府力量具有内在的依赖性。而作为政府行为的主导者,地方官员决策很大程度上取决于其所面临的各种激励,并进一步决定了区域创新系统建设中政府职能的发挥。基于2009年至2015年省级工业面板数据,对官员激励、政府创新偏好这二者之于工业创新效率影响的实证分析结果表明:官员晋升激励和经济权力激励直接提升了工业创新效率,但也会降低政府创新偏好,进而抑制工业创新效率提升;官员寻租激励下的腐败行为会侵蚀创新效率,但由于创新产出价值难以评估等属性,寻租激励下的政府官员也倾向于提高创新支出,这在一定程度上促进了创新效率提升。晋升激励和经济权力激励对创新效率的净效应为正,而寻租激励的净效应为负。有鉴于此,应当完善地方官员考核、薪酬等激励机制,加强对地方政府参与区域创新活动的监督,发挥政府在区域创新型经济建设中的引领作用。 Due to the inherent defects of market mechanism and the externality feature of innovation output,the construction of regional innovation system internally depends on the guidance and support of local government.As government actioninitiators,local officials may be influenced by various incentives when making decisions,which may have a further impact on the innovational function of government in the construction of regional innovation system.Based on the provincial industrial panel data from 2009 to 2015,this paper empirically analyzes how incentives for officials and government innovation preferences affect the innovation efficiency of industrial enterprises.The results demonstrate that promotion incentives and economic power incentives directly enhance the innovation efficiency of industrial enterprises as well as reduce the government innovation preferences,thereby inhibiting the increase of the innovation efficiency of industrial enterprises.Officials’ rent-seeking incentive may cause corruption and erode innovation efficiency of industrial enterprises.As the value produced by innovation is difficult to assess,officials’ rent-seeking may also improve the government innovation preferences,and promote the efficiency of regional innovation to some extent.The net effect of promotion incentives and economic power incentives on innovation efficiency is positive,while that of rent-seeking incentive negative.Therefore,the incentive mechanism of local officials’ assessment and compensation should be improved,and local governments actions should be supervised so that they can play a leading role in the regional innovative economy.
作者 李政 杨思莹 LI Zheng;YANG Siying(Research Center of the Chinese State-owned Economy,Jilin University,Changchun 130012;School of Economics,Jilin University,Changchun 130012,China)
出处 《北京师范大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2019年第1期135-146,共12页 Journal of Beijing Normal University(Social Sciences)
基金 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"中国国有企业创新驱动发展研究"(16JJD790017) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"技术进步偏向性 要素投入与产业结构优化研究"(16YJC790117)
关键词 官员激励 政府创新偏好 工业创新效率 incentives for officials government innovation preferences industry innovation efficiency
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