摘要
公司欺诈是一个不等同于财务舞弊或公司违规的特有现象,危害巨大。在中国,上市公司呈现出国有企业占比较高和股权集中度较高的显著特征,因此,研究股权结构与公司欺诈之间的关系具有重要意义。通过将公司欺诈分解为发生和发现两个过程,利用中国上市公司2006—2016年数据,使用基于部分可观测的Bivariate Probit估计方法对股权结构与上市公司欺诈的关系进行全面的考察,首先发现股权的国有性质是一个积极变量,国有企业实施欺诈的概率更低,已发生的欺诈活动更容易暴露。其次,投资者类型差异决定股权集中度与公司欺诈的关系:作为典型的长期投资者,国有企业的控股股东可以显著抑制公司实施欺诈的倾向;非国有企业的控股股东兼具长期与短期投资者特征,是最'纠结'的投资者,其持股比例与公司实施欺诈负相关但不显著,同时显著包庇内部已发生的欺诈活动;非控股大股东作为典型的短期投资者,显著提高了公司实施欺诈的概率。最后,以十大股东持股比例表征的股权集中度越高,欺诈活动越不容易被发现,这显然会给监管带来困扰。因此,在我国资本市场践行价值投资理念非常必要和紧迫,这就需要政府从惩戒措施和制度改革两个方面进行突破和加强。
Corporate fraud is extremely damaging,which should be distinguished from financial fraud or corporate violations.Among the listed companies in China,most are state-owned and featured by higher concentration of ownership,which leads to the need of studying the relationship between ownership structure and corporate fraud.The research divided the process of corporate fraud into conducting fraud and being exposed,and adopted the Bivariate Probit estimation method of partial observability to analyze the data of the listed company in China from 2006 to 2016.The results firstly indicate that being stated-owned is a positive variable,in other words,state-owned companies have a lower probability of committing fraud,and fraudulent activities that may occur are more likely to be exposed.Secondly,investor types determine the relationship between equity concentration and corporate fraud.As typical long-term investors,controlling shareholders of state-owned companies reduce the propensity of fraud commitment significantly.Controlling shareholders of non-state-owned companies are both long-term investors and short-term ones,thus have no significant implications on fraud commitment,but reduce the probability of fraud exposure.As typical short-term investors,non-controlling shareholders increase the probability of fraud commitment significantly.In the end,the higher the concentration of equity represented by the shareholding ratio of the top ten shareholders,the less likely it is that fraudulent activities will be exposed,which will obviously cause problems for supervision.The conclusion displays the necessity and urgency of practicing the value investment in China’s capital market,which needs the efforts of government to punish the corporate fraud more rigorously and carry on institutional reforms.
作者
胡海峰
马奔
王爱萍
HU Haifeng;MA Ben;WANG Aiping(School of Economics and Business Administration,BNU,Beijing 100875;School of Economics,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048,China)
出处
《北京师范大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第5期148-160,共13页
Journal of Beijing Normal University(Social Sciences)
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目“推进我国资本市场的改革、规范和发展研究”(14AZD035)
关键词
部分可观测
上市公司欺诈
控股股东
非控股大股东
partial observability
corporate fraud
controlling shareholders
non-controlling shareholders