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逻辑全能为何是问题

Why Logical Omniscience Is a Problem
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摘要 辛提卡构造的认知逻辑系统所刻画的认知主体具有"逻辑全能"属性,即认知主体知道自身知识的所有逻辑后承同时知道逻辑系统的所有逻辑后承。霍克特认为这一属性表明辛提卡构造的认知逻辑系统不可能是逻辑;李金厚和蒋静坪认为逻辑全能问题是个伪问题。在这里认为逻辑全能问题是认知逻辑系统表达认知主体过于理想化,该问题的解决需要在逻辑可能与认知主体的认知可能之间寻找一个平衡点。 Hintikka’s cognitive logic system have the attribute of logic omniscience, that is they know or believe all of the consequences of their knowledge or beliefs, and know all of the consequences of the logical system. Hocutt think this attribute indicates that Hintikka’s cognitive logic system is not logical; Li Jinhou and Jiang Jinping claim that the logical omniscience problem is a pseudo problem. The logical omniscience problem shows that the agent who cognitive logic characterized is too ideal. To solve the problem, in logic we may need to find a balance between the possibility of cognitive subject and the possibility of logic.
机构地区 湘潭大学哲学系
出处 《毕节学院学报(综合版)》 2016年第2期51-55,共5页 Journal of Bijie University
基金 教育部人文社科基金项目"基于认知动作和受限主体的逻辑研究" 项目编号:11YJA72040001
关键词 逻辑全能 理想主体 认知可能 逻辑可能 Logic Omniscience Ideal Agent Cognitive Possibility Logical Possibility
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参考文献8

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