存款利率上限、金融脱媒与货币政策传导

Deposit Rate Ceiling,Financial Disintermediation and Monetary Policy Transmission

文章在DSGE框架下引入抵押贷款约束和存款利率上限,研究了存款利率上限对货币政策传导的影响。根据我国的实际情况,文章允许存款利率在规定的上限内浮动,并分析了已有文献尚未涉及的存款利率上限偶然紧的情形。研究发现:(1)当央行采取紧缩性货币政策时,存款利率上限抑制了存款利率的上升,导致存款利率偏低,家庭的银行储蓄减少,从而产生金融脱媒现象;(2)金融脱媒导致银行可贷资金减少,引起贷款供给扭曲,贷款利率大幅上升,与没有存款利率上限的情形相比,经济波动更大;(3)偶然紧的存款利率上限具有非线性性质,使主要经济变量对扩张性与紧缩性货币政策冲击的脉冲反应存在不对称性。

This paper introduces collateral loan constraints and deposit rate ceiling into a DSGE model and figures out how the deposit rate ceiling affects the monetary policy transmission.According to the actual circumstance,it allows deposit rate changes under the ceiling,and considers the occasionally binding case,which is ignored by most related literature.It arrives at the following conclusions：firstly,when the central bank tights the monetary policy,the deposit rate ceiling inhibits the rise in the deposit rates,leading to lower deposit rates,the reduction in household bank deposits and thereby financial disintermediation;secondly,financial disintermediation results in the decrease in banks＇ loanable funds,the distortion of loan supply,the increase in loan rates by a big margin and bigger economic fluctuations compared to the situation without deposit rate ceiling;thirdly,the occasionally binding ceiling exhibits some non-linearity that makes the impulse response of main economic variables to expansive and tight monetary policy shocks asymmetric.