直接控股股东类型、股权激励对国有企业投资效率的影响

The Effect of the Different Controlling Shareholder and the Managerial Equity Incentives on Investment Efficiency of State- owned Corporations

以2009-2014年实施股权激励的国有控股上市公司为样本,考察直接控股股东类型和股权激励的交互作用对公司投资决策的综合影响。研究发现,股权激励水平与过度投资水平呈U型的区间效应;股票期权激励方式更容易产生加剧过度投资的"管理层防御"效应;国有公司为直接控股东更能保障股权激励产生的抑制过度投资的"利益趋同"效应的发挥,也能有效地抵制股票期权激励产生的加剧过度投资的"管理层防御"效应。

The government intervention and the insider control lead to more investment behavior in state-owned listed corporations compared to the non-state-owned listed corporations. Using the financial data of the state-owned listed corporations between the years of2009 to 2014, we investigate the effect of managerial equity incentives on the overinvestment levels, and whether the type of the directly controlling shareholder will affect this effect of managerial equity incentives on the levels of overinvestment. We find that the implementation of managerial equity incentive can restrain the levels of overinvestment, but the relationship between the levels of overinvestment and the managerial equity incentive is the U-shaped. We also find the stock option incentive is more likely to aggravate the levels of overinvestment.The state-owned firms as the directly controlling shareholders will guarantee the inhibition effect of the managerial equity incentives on the overinvestment.