公司治理对企业风险承担的影响研究被引量：8

Study on the Effects of Corporate Governance on Corporate Risk Taking

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摘要文章以沪、深两市2008-2012年上市公司为研究对象,对公司治理机制与企业风险承担间的关系进行了深入的理论分析和实证检验。研究表明:董事会规模越大,越不利于企业风险承担,而独立董事比例的提高能够降低企业管理层不愿承担风险的代理问题,进而促进企业风险承担;当董事长与总经理二职合一时,企业风险承担水平较高。股权集中度与企业风险承担呈现U型关系,而股权制衡度的提高则有利于企业风险承担。与非国有企业相比,国有企业风险承担水平更低。管理层持股与企业风险承担呈倒U型关系。 Using a corporate-level dataset of Chinese listed companies over the period of 2008--2012, this paper studies the relationship between corporate governance and corporate risk taking. The results show that： board size is negatively associated with corporate risk taking. Larger proportion of independent direc- tors can reduce the risk-averse agency problem of managers, and is conducive to corporate risk taking. The duality of chairman of boards and CEO is positively related to corporate risk taking. There is an U-shaped relationship between equity concentration and corporate risk taking, while outside blockholders are conducive to corporate risk taking. There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between managerial ownership and corporate risk taking.

作者苏坤张健

机构地区西北工业大学管理学院

出处《西安财经学院学报》 CSSCI 2016年第1期43-49,共7页 Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics

基金国家自然科学基金项目(71402141 71201125) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(14YJC790103) 陕西省自然科学基础研究计划项目(2014JQ9370) 陕西省社会科学基金项目(13D211) 西北工业大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(3102014RW0004) 中国博士后科学基金项目(2015M582705)

关键词企业风险承担公司治理代理问题 risk taking of corporate corporate governance agency problems

分类号 F271.5 [经济管理—企业管理]

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