上市公司高管薪酬规制的法律解释与规制路径选择——美国的经验评述与借鉴

On the Legal Regulations of Executive Compensation System of the Listed Companies

现代公司治理机制中,所有者和经营者存在一定的委托代理关系,其表现之一就是高管薪酬机制问题。对于高管薪酬机制的合理性可以从经济学的代理成本理论与生产成本控制理论两个方面进行分析,而其规制及惩戒还有赖于法律途径解决,包括对其进行事先预防的正面约束与事后救济的外围规范两个方面。如何从公司自身意思自治及国家对市场秩序的规制手段中求得最佳的平衡点,涉及到上市公司对外周期性的充分、真实、完整的信息披露以及法院对于该等案件的商业判断规则等合理裁量问题。

The Deputing Hypothesis argues that the Board seeks efficient employment contracts, with terms that will optimally align management＇ s incentives with those of the shareholders, minimizing agency costs. The executives have too much power in determining their own compensation contracts and the rent - seeking incentives tend to destroy shareholders wealth. We investigate the validity of these the deputing hypotheses by analyzing firms that voluntarily adopt a remuneration committee in an environment, China. And we further analysis the similar experience, both articles and cases on executives compensation, in two legal systems. After controlling for various other factors, we find that greater the potential agency costs is associated with a higher likelihood of remuneration committee adoption and the information disclo- sure, oftering some approach to improve the present situation in our country.