中国地方政府债务风险的进化博弈研究

Analysis of Local Government Debt Risk Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

日趋增长的地方政府债务对我国经济社会将产生重要影响,近两年是债务到期的高峰年份,亟需对地方政府债务风险状况进行全面、深入、定量的分析。在发债过程中,中央政府和地方政府存在着动态的博弈关系。构建进化博弈模型发现,如果地方政府违法违规举债所承担的社会风险较小,中央政府对地方政府违法违规举债的处罚较轻,地方政府违法违规举债所带来的超额收益偏高,最终,地方政府将采取违法违规举债的策略,这显然不利于降低地方政府的债务风险。因此,要控制我国地方政府的债务风险,必须畅通渠道,降低监督成本,加强惩罚力度,压缩超额收益;同时,改革财政体制,引入市场机制,切实落实新型融资方式,合理解决存量债务。

The growing debts of local government produce a significant impact on China＇s economy and society. Recent years are the peak years of maturity of the debt,the in-depth and quantitative analysis of overall situations of local government debt risk are urgently needed. In the process of issuance,dynamic game relationship exists in the central government and local governments. In the construction of evolutionary game model,we find if local governments have less risk borne by conducting illegal debts,less illegal fines of local government giving to central government,higher returns of local government will bring from illegal debts,and ultimately,local the Government will take the illegal debts strategy which is obviously not conducive to reducing the risk of local government debt. Therefore,in order to control the debt risk of local government,we must make channels flow,reduce the cost of supervision,enforce penalties,and compress extra earnings of local government. At the same time,it is necessary to reform the financial system,introduce market mechanism,and earnestly implement the new way of financing（ such as PPP）,which is a reasonable solution to the stock of debt.