政府研发补贴、社会投资跟进与企业创新融资

Government R&D Subsidies,Social Investment Follow-up,and Financing of Enterprise Technology Innovation

笔者从信号传递的视角理论诠释了政府研发补贴对企业技术创新的影响机理,并基于2004年-2013年中小板和创业板上市公司的数据,运用DID方法、Probit模型和固定效应计数模型进行实证检验。结果发现,政府研发补贴有助于缓解潜在投资者与企业之间的信息不对称,对社会投资者（特别是银行贷款）产生信号传递效应;较之银行长期贷款,政府研发补贴对银行短期贷款的信号传递效应更强;政府研发补贴本身对企业创新的促进作用不显著,但政府研发补贴与银行贷款跟进对企业技术创新具有显著的协同促进作用。

From the perspective of signal transmission,this paper theoretically interpretes the influence mechasnism of Government RD subsidies on enterprise technological innovation,and makes empirical tests using DID method,Probit model and fixed effect counting model based on the data of Listing corporations in Small board and GEM board form 2004 to 2013. The results show that：Government RD subsidies are helpful to alleviate the information asymmetry between potential investors and enterprises and produce a signal transmission effect to social investors（ especially bank loans）; Compared with long-term loans,Government RD subsidies have stronger signaltransmission efftect to the bank＇s short-term loans; Government RD subsidies themselves don＇t significantly promote enterprise innovation,while Government RD subsidies and bank loans follow-up have played a significant role in promoting enterprise technological innovation.