南北贸易、产权维护不对称与发展中国家生态资源贫瘠化

North- South Trade,Property Right Asymmetry,and Ecological Resources Impoverishment in Developing Countries

在Brander and Taylor(1997)可再生资源标准模型基础上,引入南北两国不对称的产权维护选择,考察南北贸易对两国生态资源存量变化的影响。结果表明:如果两国政府同属于资源保护的弱势政府,南方国家资源品的国内相对价格将低于北方国家,南方国家出口资源品并进口制成品,南方国家短期福利水平下降,北方国家短期福利水平上升。如果两国政府同属于资源保护的强势政府,相对价格排序、贸易模式以及短期福利变化发生逆转。在任何情况下,南方国家产权维护程度低于北方国家,唯一地决定贸易将导致南方国家生态资源存量逐渐损耗,且长期福利水平下降;北方国家生态资源存量不断增加,且长期福利水平上升。

Based on the standard renewable resources model of Brander and Taylor（ 1997）,this article introduces asymmetric property rights of North- South countries to investigates the effect of North- South trade on the change of ecological resources of trading countries. The result shows that if both countries have weak governments of resources conservation,the South’s relative price of resource goods is lower than that of the North,and the South exports resource goods and imports manufactured goods,thus the South ’s short- run welfare declines,and the North ’s short- run welfare increases. On the other hand,if both countries have strong governments of resource conservation,then the relative price ranking,trade patterns and the short- run welfare results reverses. But regardless of the governmental type,as a result of which that the property right enforcement level of the South is lower than that of the North,which uniquely determines that the international trade leads to the gradual ecological resources depletion in the South,and its long- run welfare worsens;while the ecological resources stock increase gradually in the North and its long- run welfare improves.