政府扶持企业接收并培养实习生的演化博弈

An Evolutionary Game of Government Supported Enterprises Intern Recruit and Training

高校学生实习难、就业难的一个主要原因在于企业参与接受培养实习生的动力不足.企业作为有限理性的经济体要接收大学生到本企业参与实习的前提是要能增加自身的收益.若收益低于成本则企业的占优策略将是拒绝接收实习生.面对学生实习难的问题,尝试利用演化博弈模型、演化稳定策略、复制动态方程,定量分析在政府群体的扶持策略下,企业群体接收并培养实习生策略的演化过程及稳定均衡状态.结果表明,实习生为企业创造的收益、经过企业培养后的实习生的失业率、政府需要承担的失业补助金、失业造成的社会成本、成功就业的学生为政府增加的税收收入、政府给予企业的财政补贴、税收减免等因素都会影响着政府和企业的行动策略和稳定均衡状态.

A major reason for college students＇ difficulties in intern training and employment lies in the less motive force of these enterprises. As bounded rationality economy, the enterprises take benefits as the premise of intern training. The dominant strategy is rejection of intern training if the income is less than the cost. Using evolutionary game model, evolutionary stable strategy, copy dynamic equations and quantitative analysis, the evolution process and stable equilibrium state of these enterprises＇ intern recruit and training were analyzed. The results show that the profits created by interns, the interns＇ unemployment rate, unemployment compensation, social costs of unemployment, tax revenues contributed by employed students, financial subsidies, tax breaks and other factors influence the action strategy and the stable equilibri- um between government and enterprises.