下游企业与上游企业副产品合作中的价格激励合约设计

Price Incentive Contract Design for By-Product Cooperation of Upstream and Downstream Enterprise

副产品的价格是生态产业链能否形成的关键。为了确认下游企业在不同情况下应如何定价,运用合同理论,在道德风险下以及逆向选择和道德风险共存下建立价格激励模型,得出如下结论:当上下游企业仅存在道德风险时,下游企业应当提供固定价格合约,以诱使上游企业采取有效率的努力措施;当上下游企业道德风险和逆向选择共存时,下游企业应对低成本参数型上游企业提供固定价格合约,对高成本参数型上游企业提供成本分摊合约。此合约保证了低成本参数型上游企业的努力水平,使高成本参数型上游企业的努力水平向下扭曲了,但它保证了两类企业对自己的成本参数类型说真话。

The price of by-product is the key to determine whether ecological industry chain can be formed or not. In order to confirm how to price for downstream enterprises under different circum- stances, this paper analyzed price incentive model under moral hazard and under the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard on the basis of contract theory, and drew the following conclu- sions： when upstream enterprise and downstream enterprise only exist under moral hazard, the down- stream enterprise should provide a fixed price contract and induce upstream enterprise to adopt effi- cient measures; When upstream enterprise and downstream enterprise exist under moral hazard and adverse selection, downstream enterprise should provide a fixed price contract to upstream enterprise with low cost parameter, and provide a cost allocation contract tO upstream enterprise with high cost parameter. Although in this contract the effort level of upstream downward distorted, it ensures the two types of enterprises to tell eter types. enterprise the truth about low cost parameter is their own cost param-eter types.