摘要
基于风险竞技场理论,通过对BOBO城垃圾分类转运站事件的个案研究,审视了邻避风险的社会生成逻辑及其运作机制,从而揭开了"中国式邻避冲突困境"的症结。首先,作为一种社会互动的产物,不同风险心智图式及风险建构策略是风险竞技场中邻避风险运作的内驱力,即风险认知结构错位是博弈双方风险沟通失败的重要原因;其次,家园意识崛起及制度化利益表达机制的缺失导致社区居民采用非常规行动以打破政府单方主导的博弈规则,进而实现利益诉求的非正式表达;最后,一方面邻避项目是地方领导者经济资源和政治资源的重要载体,另一方面它引起的群体性事件会侵蚀政府权力行使的社会基础,从而导致地方政府的执政危机,使得博弈双方的风险互动陷入新一轮的"立项—抗议—停止"之中。
Based on the theory of risk arena,this paper takes the event of garbage classification transfer station of BOBO community for instance to see the logic of NIMBY risk and its operation mechanism,which may uncover the crux of Chinese NIMBY conflict dilemma. First, as a product of social interaction,different risk mental schema and risk construction strategy is the internal driving force o NIMBY risk operation in risk arena. Therefore,mismatching of risk cognitive structure is an important facto which may cause the failure of risk communication.Second,the rising housing consciousness and lacking o institutionalized interest expression mechanism leads to community residents' unconventional action to break game rules that unilaterally dominated by local government in order to informally express interests. Finally, the particularity of NIMBY projects shows that it is an importan carrier of local leaders of economic resources and politica resources. And the particularity of NIMBY projects may result in collective events,which may erode the social basis of the authority of local administration,cause ruling crisis and make it into a new round of 'establishing-protesting postponing'action.
出处
《河海大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2015年第6期36-42,98,共7页
Journal of Hohai University:Philosophy and Social Sciences
基金
2014年度江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划项目(1064B14041)