项目制下各利益主体博弈及其解释——以水库移民后期扶持项目为分析对象

The Game of Stakeholders in the Context of Project Scheme and Explanation Concerned: A Case Study of Late-Stage Support Project of Reservoir Migrants

从制度设计来说,水库移民后期扶持项目有着紧密的组织体制与管理体制,但水库移民后期扶持项目制在实际操作过程中偏离了政策目标,导致移民后期扶持项目资金使用绩效低,甚至出现"跑渗漏"的情况。从委托方—承包方—代理方互动的博弈过程分析水库移民后期扶持项目制,研究发现:委托方(中央政府及省级政府)与承包方(地市级政府及县级政府)之间的博弈、承包方内部各政府部门之间的博弈、承包方(移民管理机构)与代理方(乡镇政府、项目申报人)之间的博弈、代理人(项目申报人)与移民(村民)间的博弈导致水库移民后期扶持项目制度设计与制度执行之间存在差距,使得水库移民后期扶持项目资金使用绩效较差。

In terms of system design,the late-stage support project of reservoir migrants has well-planned organization and management system. But in the process of actual operation,it deviates from the policy goals pertaining to the late-stage support project scheme, which leads to low performance in fund use. Based on the game analysis among the client,the contractor and the agent,it is found that the sharp gap among the stakeholders make the low performance in fund use available. The games among the stakeholders are as follows: the game between the client( the central government and provincial governments) and contractor( the municipal government and the county),the game between the contractor and the various government departments,the game between the contractor( migrant management agencies) and the agent( township government and the applicant of project),the game between the agent( the applicant of project) and migrants( villagers).