大股东的业绩补偿承诺抑制上市公司研发创新吗?——基于重大重组并购的经验证据

Performance Compensation Commitment,Innovation and Corporate Performance——Evidence based on Major M&A Events

以2007—2016年上市公司的重大重组并购事件为初始样本,手工收集沪、深两市交易所并购事件的公告文件,整理出有关业绩补偿承诺的数据,运用倾向得分匹配(PSM)和双重差分(DID)等方法,研究签订业绩补偿承诺对企业研发创新和公司绩效的影响。结果发现:在重组并购的事件中,承诺方大股东的业绩补偿承诺与并购后企业研发创新水平显著负相关;相对于创新型企业,非创新型企业中业绩补偿承诺对研发创新的负面效应更强;签订业绩补偿协议与并购后企业短期绩效显著正相关,但与长期绩效负相关。经济政策不确定性加剧了业绩补偿承诺对研发创新的抑制作用;反之,地区产权保护越好,这种抑制效应越弱。研究表明:业绩补偿承诺虽然可以降低产权交易成本,提高并购效率,但也会抑制企业研发,影响长期绩效。

Taking the major M&A events from 2007 to 2016 as samples,combining the data of the content of performance compensation commitment(PCC)by collecting the announcement documents of each merger in SSE and SZSE,the effect of PCC on enterprise innovation and corporate performance in reorganization was studied.Using propensity score matching(PSM)and differencein-differences(DID)methods,the empirical results show that,the PCC agreement of major shareholders has a negative correlation with the investment level of innovation after M&A;compared with non-innovative firms,the negative effect of the PCC on innovation firms is stronger;further study shows that the PCC agreement is positively correlated with the short-term performance,but is negatively correlated with long-term performance after M&A.The conclusion of this paper will help to improve the design of specific terms of PCC agreement,and provide reference for the application of PCC agreement in M&A,which is of great significance to mutual benefit.