政府补偿下基于私人公平偏好的PPP项目投资决策分析

Analysis of Private Investment Decision-making in PPP Project based on Fairness Preference under Governmental Compensation

针对PPP(Private-Public Partnership)项目收益的不确定性,引入政府补偿契约问题。考虑私人投资者对政府补偿存在公平偏好倾向,借鉴BO模型的思想,将私人投资要求的特许收益作为其公平参考点,并通过对FS模型加以改进,构建私人公平偏好效用函数,从而给出私人在政府补偿下的投资决策模型。通过模型求最优解和概率分析,探讨私人公平偏好对其最优投资决策的影响,并借助数值分析给予检验。结果表明:当政府补偿使私人感知有利不公平时,私人将选择期望效用最大的最优投资,并随其感知程度的增加而增加;而当政府补偿使私人感知不利不公平时,私人最优投资及可能性将在有限公平偏好内随其感知程度的增加而减小。

In view of the uncertainty of the Private-Public-Partnership project’s income,the government compensation contract is introduced.Considering that the private investor has the fair preference for the government compensation,the private claimed concession profit is taken as its fair reference point based on the idea of BO model,and the private fair utility function is established by improving the FS model.In this way,the decision-making model for the private investor is given out under the government compensation.By the optimal solution of the model and the probability analysis,the effect of private equity preference on the optimal investment decision is investigated,and the obtained results are verified by the numerical analysis.The results show that when the government compensation is perceived favorable unfair,private investor will choose the optimal investment by which the private expected utility is maximized,and the optimal investment will increase with the increasing of the private perception degree;otherwise,when the government compensation is perceived unfavorable unfair,the private optimal investment and the probability of choosing the optimal investment will decrease with the increase of the private perception degree in the private limited fairness preference.