论胡塞尔感受概念的经典图像及其困难

On the Standard Picture of Husserl's Concept of Sensation and Its Difficulties

感受或者感觉材料概念有深厚的哲学渊源,也是胡塞尔现象学哲学中最为基础的概念之一。根据有关胡塞尔感受概念的经典图像或理解,感受是内在于意识的内容;意识在感受基础上构建起意向对象;感受有充实认知性的意向活动的功能;感受自身并非认知对象,却能够被体验到,并被现象学反思所把握。同时,感受还具有内在性、非意向性、被动性、非概念性、非构造性、非独立性等核心特征。然而,这个经典图像存在着诸多难以解决的困难。意识可能无需在感受基础上构建对象,感受也无法充当充实。感受概念还得不到任何认知上的确证——因为,即便根据现象学的标准,反思不能为此提供任何证据。同时,感受可能也并非内在的,而且还具有意向性、概念性和构造性。对经典图像的合理批评倒逼我们在先验—生成现象学中寻找更为合理的感受概念。

The concept of sensation has deep philosophical root, and it is also a fundamental concept in Husserl's phenomeological philosophy. According to the classic picture of Husserl's concept of sensation, sensation is the immanent content of consciousness and intentional object is constituted on its basis. In addition, sensation has the function to fulfill epistemic intentional act. Although it is not the object of consciousness, it can be given to consciousness via reflection. Meanwhile, sensation is immanent, non-intentional, passive, non-conceptual and is not constituted. However, this classic picture has various difficulties. Consciousness may not need to constitute object on the basis of sensation, and it is incapable of functioning as fulfillment. Sensation cannot be epistemically justified, because even according to phenomenological standard, reflection does not give any evidence for the existence of sensation. Meanwhile, sensation is probably not immanet, intentional, conceptual and constituted. The reasonable critique of the classic picture of sensation drives us to seek a more justifiable concept of sensation in transcendental-genetic phenomenology.