“网络专车”的法经济学分析

“Online Ride- Hailing " Analyzed from the perspective of Jurisprudential Economics

自嘀嘀、易到、优步等一众网络专车APP迅速占领移动互联网交通服务,以北上广为城市代表的交通管理部门一度打出"组合拳"对新兴事物进行严打,并引发了广泛的舆论争议。究其根源无疑在于网络专车平台打破了原有出租车行业的生态,直面撼动旧有垄断体制,直接分割既得利益集团的"奶酪"。借助法经济学的理论模型分析可知,当边际成本等于边际收益时达到帕累托最优,实现市场最高效,而"行政垄断"造成了出租车产业的低效和高额"份子钱";其次,对现行制度中"禁止私家车接入专车平台"的规定进行了法经济模型分析,对于需要进行市场先期占领的成长型软件而言,允许私家车接入专车平台则会实现企业规模效益,提高闲置资源的使用效率,充分发挥市场配置资源的决定作用,从而实现经济的真正共享。

Since such online ride -hailing apps as Didi, Kuaidi and San Francisco -based Uber quickly occupied online ride -hailing industry. Traffic management departments in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou as representatives took a series of strict measures to launch the crackdown the newly sprouted, which sparked ex- tensive public controversy. Tracing it to its source, there is no doubt that the network broke former benefits pattern in the taxi industry, the old monopoly system of the original taxi industry, which got the interests ＂ cheese＂ from the vested interest groups,had to face new challenges. According to the theoretical models of e- conomics, when the marginal cost equals marginal revenue, Pareto optimal will be got and the most efficient market will be achieved. However, ＂administrative monopoly＂ resulted in inefficiency and high share of ex- penses for a joint undertaking given to administrative agency. Secondly, the paper made the jurisprudential e- conomics model analysis of prohibiting the access of private car into online ride - hailing system. To those growing software for market pre - occupation, allowing private car into online ride - hailing system will achieve economies of scale of these enterprises, improving the efficient use of idle resources, and giving full play to the role of market in the decisive function of resource allocation, and thus achieve genuine sharing in economy.