摘要
本文对国有企业产能扩张与产能过剩之间的机制进行了理论探索和经验检验。国有企业性质使其具有产能过度扩张的内部激励;而基于所有制的信贷扭曲为其扩张提供了外部激励;经济危机之后,政府主导的经济刺激政策同时从内外两方面激励了国有企业的产能扩张,加重了产能过剩问题。本文利用2000-2011年间我国36个工业行业的面板数据模型对国有企业、信贷扭曲与产能利用率之间的关系进行了经验验证。实证结果表明:行业的国有控股比例以及国有企业信贷规模对行业产能利用率具有显著的负面效应;且负面效应在2008年之后被进一步强化。
This paper theoretically explores and empirically tests the mechanism between the expansive and excess capacity of SOEs. The nature of SOEs makes them have the internal stimulation that leads to excessive capacity expansion. After the economic crisis,the economic stimulating policy dominated by the government stimulated the expansive capacity of SOEs internally and externally and aggravated excess capacity problem. This paper empirically tests the relationship among SOEs,credit distortion and capacity utilization rate by using the panel data model of 36 Chinese 36 SOEs in industrial sector from 2000 to 2011. The empirical results indicate that: the state-owned stock controlling proportion of the industry and the credit scale of SOEs have significant negative effect on the capacity utilization rate of the industry and the negative effects will be strengthened after 2008.
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第1期58-67,126,共10页
Modern Economic Science
基金
国家社科基金重大项目"经济稳定增长前提下优化投资与消费的动态关系研究"(项目号:12&ZD088)
国家自然科学基金青年项目"短视认知偏差
偏好动态不一致与地方政府投资中的冲动或拖延:机制分析与管理建议"(项目号:71103094)
关键词
产能过剩
产能利用率
国有企业
信贷扭曲
行业面板
Excess Capacity
Capacity Utilization Rate
State-owned Enterprise
Credit Distortion
Industrial Panel Data