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我国汽车零部件业上市公司股权结构对代理成本的影响研究 被引量:1

A Study on the Effects of the Ownership Structure on Agency Costs of China's Listed Auto Components Industry
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摘要 当今社会,代理成本仍旧是一个不容小觑的问题,也是大部分我国上市企业一直存在着的问题,代理成本与公司的治理结构有着千丝万缕的关联。从公司治理角度,以中国汽车零部件业的上市公司为样本,选取了2004—2013年共10年数据,分析了股权结构与代理成本之间的关系,对企业代理成本与股权结构关系进行理论分析与实证研究。结果表明:除了前5大股东比例之和与我国汽车零部件业上市公司代理成本无显著正相关之外,第一大股东的相对优势Z指数、国有股、法人股以及流通股均与我国汽车零部件业上市公司代理成本有着显著的密切联系,这表明在某种程度上代理成本问题可以从股权结构的角度来解决。 In today's society,agency cost is still a problem to be reckoned with, and most of the listed companies in China have been facing such a problem because agency costs are highly associated with the company' s governance structure. The paper,from the perspective of corporate governance,taking China' s listed auto components industry companies as samples, selected the data from 2004 to 20130, analyzed the relationship between ownership structure and agency costs. Results show that, except the fact that the sum of the top five shareholders ratios has no significant positive correlation with China auto parts industry,the agency cost of listed companies, the largest shareholder's comparative advantage Z index, state-owned shares and legal person share and tradable shares has a significant close correlation with the agency cost of listed company of auto parts industry in China, which suggests that the agency cost problem can he solved from the perspective of equity structure.
出处 《技术与创新管理》 2016年第1期70-75,共6页 Technology and Innovation Management
基金 安徽省教育厅人文社科项目(2011sk717) 安徽省领导圈定课题(SLDQDKT14-21F)
关键词 汽车零部件业 上市公司 公司治理 代理成本 股权结构 auto components industry listed companies agency costs ownership structure
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