摘要
本文在多个相互竞争的零售商具有损失厌恶偏好的假设下,研究了单个供应商和多个零售商组成的二级供应链的回购契约协调模型,研究发现:相互竞争的零售商之间存在唯一的一组使其期望效用最大化的最优订货量和最优零售价格组合,并进一步论证了回购参数和损失厌恶程度及销售价格之间的关系,在此基础上,通过数值分析验证了回购契约的有效性。
This paper studied a two- stage supply chain composed of a risk- neutral supplier and multiple competing and loss- a- verse retailers, investigating the coordination of supply chain with buyback contract. It shows that there is a unique combination of the opti- mal order quantity and optimal retail price to maximize the expected utility of multiple competing and loss- averse retailers. Furthermore, the buyback contract parameter has the relation with loss aversion parameter and the retail price. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the availability of the buyback contract.
出处
《工业技术经济》
北大核心
2016年第1期19-25,共7页
Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"共享腹地港口群国际物流系统网络复杂性及优化方法研究"(项目编号:71171084)
关键词
一对多
供应链协调
损失厌恶
回购契约
纳什均衡
one-to-many
supply chain coordination
loss aversion
buyback contract
Nash equilibrium