基于公共品资本化的地方财政激励制度研究——土地财政如何影响公共品提供

PERSPECTIVE OF PUBLIC GOODS CAPITALIZATION——How Does Land Finance Affect Public Goods Provision

本文以中国的城镇化为背景,运用公共品资本化原理,分析了地方土地财政制度,包括土地出让金收入制度与房地产相关税收制度,对地方公共品提供激励的传导机制。城市级面板数据的实证分析表明:土地财政对地方公共品提供具有结构性的激励效应,但该激励机制建立在土地和房产交易之上,地方财政努力程度被交易时点截然分割。改革土地财政制度,完善房地产税收体系,实现从交易型向保有型"土地溢价回收"制度转换,将有助于建立对称的、可持续的地方财政激励制度。

Under the background of China＇s urbanization, applying the theory of public goods capitalization, this paper analyzes how the local land finance institution, including the land grant revenue institution and the related real estate tax institution, incentives the local public goods provision. Empirical analysis of city level data shows the land finance＇s structural incentive effect on local public goods provision, but owing to the incentive mechanism based on land and real estate transactions, local government＇s fiscal ef- fort is dissevered entirely by the trading point. Reforming the land finance system, and improving the tax system of real estate, with the purpose of land value capture system transformation from transactional style to asset-keeping style, will help to establish a symmetrical, sustainable local fiscal incentive system.