无认证、强制认证和自愿认证:中国乳制品认证制度的博弈分析

No certification, compulsory certification or voluntary certification: a game analysis of Chinese dairy products' certification system

认证制度是解决食品安全问题的一种政策工具。本文构建博弈模型分析无认证、强制认证和自愿认证三种情况下乳企和政府的行为特征与策略选择,并结合中国乳业的具体实践探讨各种认证方式的特点与适用条件。研究表明:无认证时,乳企的占优策略是生产低质量安全水平的产品,政府需要承担较高的事后监管成本;强制认证时,乳企选择生产高质量产品,政府摆脱无限监管责任;自愿认证时,认证成为乳企传递质量安全信息的一种途径,生产高质量产品乳企可以自由选择是否参与认证;随着我国乳业的发展,理想的认证制度应该是以强制认证为基础,以多种自愿认证为主体的认证体系。

Certification system is one of the policy instruments which can solve the food safety problem.This thesis analyzes behavior charac- teristics and strategy choices of dairy enterprises and government based on the game model of no citification,compulsive and voluntary certifi- cation.It also studies features and applicable conditions of these kinds of certification. It is found that when no-certification is applied, the dominant strategy of dairy enterprises is to manufacture products of low quality and safety level, while the government will take high cost ex postsupervision; when compulsive certification is applied, dairy enterprises will manufacture high quality and safety level products, govern- ment can get rid of unlimited responsibility of supervision;whenvohintary certification is applied,dairy enterprises will utilize certification as an approach to transmit the information of quality and safety level of products, and the enterprises which manufacture high quality and safety level products can choose whether to participate the voluntary certification or not at his own will. With the development of Chinese dairy industry, the ideal certification system should be based on compulsive certification, while take a variety of voluntary certifications as the principle part.