基于产品差异化的企业最优碳税征收策略

文章建立了完全信息对称下由政府主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,从产品绿色度的层面研究了碳税对于制造商决策、消费者效用以及社会总福利的影响。通过数值模拟分析发现,随着碳税税率升高,产品的零售价格呈现上升趋势,普通产品的最优生产量随之降低,低碳产品的最优生产量随之增加,社会总福利相应减少。因此,建议政府建立差异化碳税体系,对于碳排放较高的企业进行低碳技术引导,倡导国民低碳消费,并且在碳税立法过程中注重遵循市场规律。

In this paper, a Stackelberg game model led by the government was proposed in the case of complete information symmetry. From the perspective of the green degree of the products, the paper analyzed the impact of carbon tax on the decisions of manufacturing companies, consumer utility and total social welfare. Through numerical simulation analysis, it showed that the retailing price of the products was increased with the increase of carbon tax. The optimal production of ordinary products was reduced with the increase of carbon tax, but the optimal production of low-carbon products was increase and the total welfare was reduced as the carbon tax increased. Finally, it proposed that the government should establish the differential carbon tax systems, and give advice for the enterprises with higher carbon emissions to use low carbon technology. Low-carbon consumption can be advocated nationally. Carbon tax legislation process should follow the market law.