理由的多副面孔

Many Faces of Reasons

根据"理由"所使用语境的不同,我们可以区分出驱动理由、规范理由、限度理由和"为什么"的理由。有人认为理由的不同是本体论上的不同。一个代表性的观点是:驱动理由是心理状态,规范理由是事实。这个观点实际上混淆了驱动状态与驱动理由,削弱了道德判断的实践效力。在道德慎思情形中,规范理由是可以成为驱动理由的。更一般地,限度理由和真正的"为什么"的理由都可以成为驱动理由。因此,这三种理由可以统一于驱动理由。而驱动理由或者是行动者的心理状态,或者是外部世界中的事实。

The concept ＂reason＂ has many senses. In the light of the roles it plays in different contexts, we can distinguish four kinds of reasons, that is, motivating reasons, normative reasons, pro tanto reasons and reasons why. Many philosophers think that reasons of different kinds belong to different ontological categories, for example, to facts in the case of normative reasons, and to mental states in the case of motivating reasons. But this view confuses motivating states with reasons, and weakens the practical efficacy of moral judgements. In the case of moral deliberation normative reasons can become motivating reasons. More generally, both pro tanto reasons and genuine reasons why can become motivating reasons. Thus these three kinds of reasons can be united in motivating reasons in ontological level. And motivating reasons are either agent＇s mental states or facts in the world.