摘要
心理主义和事实主义是对"行动理由是什么"的两种回答。心理主义是错误的,因为"主体给予"的理由无法支持行动。事实主义则面临着一个严重的挑战,即错误信念问题。丹西的非事实理论克服了事实主义的困难,但是难以说明坏情况下理由的事实性来源。本文提出了理由的条件句学说,在保留丹西理论优点的同时解决了它的难题。
Psychologism and factualism are the two answers of the question ‘what are the reasons of action'. The former is wrong because a subject-given reason is not in favor of action. The latter is facing a serious challenge namely the false belief problem. Dancy' s non-factive theory solves the problem of factualism, however, it fails to account for the source of factuality in the bad case. In this paper, I put forward a conditional clause account of reasons of action by which the merits of Dancy's theory are preserved and its problems are solved.
出处
《山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第1期154-160,共7页
Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
基金
山东大学自主创新基金人文社科团队项目"意图与行动的哲学研究"(IFYT12049)