摘要
德绍尔建立了不同于康德和恩格斯的物自体观,但存在着悖论。康德不可知的超验物自体可以区分为感性物自体和理念物自体,二者与经验对象有不同的关系。德绍尔把技术人工物的物自体(TII2)与自然物的物自体(TII1)分离开来,认为TII1是康德的感性物自体,TII2是康德的理念物自体;TII2隐藏在上帝创造的技术理念中,人类的技术发明活动使之得到物化;较之科学认识活动,人类的技术发明活动拓展和经验了上帝创造的可能性领域,TII2可知,TII1不可知。基于经验事实,TII2是人类以TII1为基础建构的,它包含着人类的目的或意向,与TII1具有某种程度的同一性。
Dessauer holds different views of thing-in-itself from Kant and Engels,but there is a paradox in his ideas.Kant'unknowable thing-in-itself contains the perceptual one and the ideal one,which have different relationships with empirical objects.Dessauer regards the thing-in-itself of nature objects(TII1)as Kant's perceptual one and the thing-in-itself of artifacts(TII2)as Kant's ideal one,thus separating TII1 and TII2 completely.TII2 hides itself in the technological ideas created by God, which can be materialized with human beings'technological invention activities.Compared to scientific understanding activities,human beings broaden and experience the possible territories created by God with their technological invention activities.TII2 is known while TII1 is unknown.Based on the empirical facts,human beings construct TII2 based on TII1,and TII2 contains human beings'purposes or intentions,which is of identity with TII1 to some extent.
出处
《东北大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第1期12-17,共6页
Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)
基金
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关资助项目(11JZD007)
关键词
康德
德绍尔
物自体
技术人工物
悖论
Immanuel Kant
Friedrich Dessauer
thing-in-itself
artifact
paradox