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时机选择、军力对比与领土争端升级 被引量:6

Opportunity Choice,Relative Military Strength and Territorial Disputes Escalation
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摘要 领土争端有的升级乃至引发战争,有的沉寂休眠。作为一种普遍现象,领土争端升级有复杂的根源。在升级程度不同的领土争端中,挑战国的行为逻辑差异巨大,主要体现为升级目的和预期代价的不同。考虑到领土争端升级程度差异,军力对比、升级时机与争议领土价值可以有效地解释领土争端升级的原因。通过大样本统计研究发现,在高烈度升级的领土争端中,由于挑战方改变现状的行动会给对手安全造成更大威胁,进而可能招致更大的反击,预期代价较高,因而军力对比和时机选择对于挑战国更为重要;在中低烈度升级的领土争端中,决策者升级领土争端可能是为了释放国内压力或者引起国际关注,给对手造成的安全威胁并不高,预期代价较低,时机选择对挑战国升级行为影响较小,军力对比则不会发挥显著作用。同时,争议领土的价值越高,挑战方更可能升级领土争端。对中国而言,应提高小国升级领土争端的代价,避免多处领土争端同时升级,加强对争议领土的控制,管控领土争端升级,塑造良好的周边环境。 Why do some territorial disputes escalate and even cause war,but others keep silent? For territorial disputes with various escalation levels,the mechanisms that states take actions vary,reflecting different goals and expected cost.The levels of territorial disputes escalation,relative military strength,the opportunity of escalation and the value of disputed territory serve as better explanation variables.This study by large N statistics finds that highly escalated territorial disputes are more sensitive to relative military strength and opportunity,for the reason that high-amplitude escalation threat other states' safety more heavily,and therefore would invite more strike back.On the contrary,low and mildly escalated territorial disputes are less sensitive to relative military strength and opportunity,for the reason that the goal of decision makers may be releasing domestic pressure or drawing international attention,so escalations do not pose serious threat to others.In addition,challengers will more likely escalate territorial disputes which have higher value.And China should raise the cost of other states escalating,and avoid being drawn in several escalating while strengthening the control of disputed territories,in order to manage territorial disputes escalation and create a good environment for China's rise.
作者 董柞壮
出处 《世界经济与政治》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第1期140-155,160,共16页 World Economics and Politics
关键词 领土争端 军力对比 争端升级 预期代价 territorial disputes relative military strength opportunity of escalation value of disputed territory
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