摘要
查默斯提出"自然主义二元论",向当代心灵哲学中占主导地位的物理主义发起进攻。但是,由于自然主义和物理主义在学理上天然地联系在一起,查默斯实际上并未摆脱物理主义的窠臼。查默斯的二元论特征是:一方面,在本体论中增加了非物理的东西即经验(亦即意识或感受性);另一方面,由于查默斯拒绝把康德目的论作为功能和信息的本体论基础,致使他走向另一极端即泛心论。在笔者看来,查默斯的意识理论在这两个方面都存有严重的缺陷。
Chalmers advances the "naturalistic dualism" in order to launch an attack toward physicalism which oc- cupies the dominant position in contemporary philosophy of mind. But because naturalism and physicalism are linked together naturally, Chalmers can' t actually free himself from physicalism. The characters of Chalmers' s du- alism are : On the one hand, some non-physical thing such as experience ( consciousness, or qualia) is added to on- tology, on the other hand, Chalmers refuses to take Kant' s teleology as the ontological foundation of function and information, going to extremes of panpsychism. Research shows that Chalmers' s theory of consciousness has serious defects in it.
出处
《科学技术哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第1期9-15,共7页
Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
基金
国家社科基金重大项目(15ZDB016)
中国逻辑学会学术研究重点项目(13CLZD001)
关键词
自然主义二元论
意识
物理主义
泛心论
查默斯
naturalistic dualism
consciousness
physicalism
panpsychism
Chalmers