期刊文献+

对笛卡尔预设的批判与重建——兼论戴维特的温和解释论

Critique and Reconstruction of Cartesian Presupposition——On Devitt's Modest Explanation
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摘要 传统的扶手椅哲学诉诸直觉的方法提供可靠的证据,其合法性问题一直以来都是哲学家们难以逾越的鸿沟。乔姆斯基从语义学理论出发,提出笛卡尔预设,为直觉证据的先天可靠性进行辩护。当前,面临实验哲学直觉的文化差异性研究的严峻挑战。戴维特试图从实验语义学出发,通过质疑笛卡尔预设,批判笛卡尔解释,提出一种经验负载的温和解释论,重建为直觉可靠性辩护的可能路径。温和解释论不仅使得传统的扶手椅哲学的理论重新焕发了活力,还为实验语义学的发展提供了一种可能的方法论。同时,温和的解释论也存在一定的局限性。 The traditional armchair philosophy appeals to the intuition as reliable evidence, but its legitimacy has al- ways been challenged, forming a big gap difficult to bridge. Facing the severe challenge of experimental philoso- phy, Michael Devitt attempts to doubt the Cartesian presupposition and criticize the Cartesian explanation so as to propose a modest explanation laden with experience to offer possible defense for the reliability of the intuition. The modest explanation not only revives the armchair philosophy, but also opens a possible way for the development of experimental semantics. However, it does have limitations.
作者 范莉 杨金坤
出处 《科学技术哲学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第1期38-42,共5页 Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
基金 山西省高等学校哲学社会科学研究项目资助"概念分析与科学思想创新研究"(2013206)
关键词 笛卡尔预设 生成直觉 笛卡尔解释 温和解释论 Cartesian presupposition generative intuition Cartesian explanation modest explanation
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参考文献11

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