保增长压力、刺激计划与工业用地出让

Growth Pressures,Stimulus Plan and Industrial Land Transfer

在中国特殊的分权体制下,中央的宏观经济政策必须依赖于那些掌握大量经济和行政资源的地方政府配合。为了探究中国宏观经济政策的传导机制,本文基于2007—2011年中国城市工业用地出让数据,利用双重差分方法考察了"四万亿"刺激计划对工业用地出让的影响。研究结果发现:(1)保增长压力会促使城市政府更积极地利用刺激计划而更多地出让工业用地,但财政压力却会制约城市政府对刺激计划的利用能力;(2)当且仅当中央实施宽松的宏观政策,那些保增长压力更大的城市政府才能够比其他城市政府出让更多的工业用地;(3)若市委书记的在任时间越长,尤其是超过3年,则会促使这些保增长压力大的城市政府在刺激计划下出让更多的工业用地。这些实证结果暗示,基于经济增长业绩的晋升竞争压力是地方政府招商引资、发展地方经济的重要动力来源;而这又对中国宏观经济政策效果和经济波动产生了复杂的相互影响。

In China＇s unique decentralized system, macroeconomic policies of the central authorities must rely on local governments who have substantial financial and administrative resources. In order to explore the running mechanism of China＇s macroeconomic policy based on the data of urban industrial land in 2007--2011 ; we investigate how stimulus plan determine industrial land transfer by using difference in difference method. Our results show ： （ 1 ） growth pressure will make local government more active to using stimulus plans and have more industrial land transfer, but fiscal pressure is will restricted; （2） without stimulus plan,growth pressure does not take effect on land transfer in local government; （3） When the tenure of municipal secretary in office is more long, especially over 3 years, local government are more likely to give more industrial land transfer. These results suggest that, promotion incentive of economic growth performance competition is important motivation for local government investment and economic development. This effect also has impact on China＇s macro-economic policy and economic volatility.