期刊文献+

论中国银行业合并的申报标准

Research on Bank Merger Notification Threshold in China
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摘要 恰当的银行合并申报标准对提高反垄断管制机构的工作效率和规范银行业的合并行为具有重要意义。《金融业经营者集中申报营业额计算办法》为中国银行业合并申报的营业额赋予了10%的计算权重。这一标准过于严格,不符合中国银行业的现实,不符合合并申报标准宜相对宽松的要求,加重了管制机构的负担。同时,这一《办法》只规定了银行合并的主体标准,没有规定交易标准。因此,需要对该《办法》进行修订和完善。 Appropriate banking merger notification threshold is of great significance to improve the efficiency of anti-monopoly regulatory agencies and regulate banking consolidation behavior. July 15, 2009, the Ministry of Commerce, the People's Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission and China Insurance Regulatory Commission formulated "the financial sector merger notification turnover calculating method", which gave the banking turnover 10% of the calculated weights. This threshold is too strict to meet the reality of China's banking sector, neither does meet the relatively relaxed requirements about banking merger notification. This method increases the burden of regulatory agencies. Meanwhile, this method ignores the deals scale threshold in merger notification. So, it should be revised and improved.
作者 王国红
出处 《湖北经济学院学报》 2016年第1期12-17,共6页 Journal of Hubei University of Economics
基金 国家社科基金项目(09CJY048)
关键词 银行合并 合并申报 申报标准 bank merger merger notification notification threshold
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参考文献4

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