高管薪酬激励与机会主义效应的盈余管理——基于会计稳健性视角的经验证据

Executive Compensation Incentive and Opportunistic Earnings Management——An Empirical Research Based on Accounting Conservatism

以我国2006-2013年A股数据为研究样本,从会计稳健性视角,基于盈余管理异质性,实证检验了高管薪酬激励与机会主义效应的应计及真实盈余管理的关系。结果表明:货币薪酬及股权薪酬激励能有效抑制机会主义效应的两种盈余管理,但股权薪酬激励对机会主义效应的应计盈余管理作用大于真实盈余管理。在对机会主义效应的两种盈余管理发挥的抑制作用上,高管薪酬激励与会计稳健性存在互补关系,且该互补关系受投资者保护水平的影响。

Using the samples of A-share listed companies from year 2006 to 2013 and from perspective of accounting conservatism, based on earnings management heterogeneity, this paper empirically investigates the relationship between top executive incentive compensation and two different opportunism earnings management. Results show that, monetary incentive compensation and equity incentive compensation can effectively inhibit two kinds of opportunism earnings management, however, as to equity incentive compensation, this effect is much higher for opportunism accrual earnings management than that of opportunism real earnings management. Top executive incentive compensation and accounting conservatism complement with each other on inhibiting the two kinds of opportunism earnings management, and this complementary relationship is influenced by investor protection context.