流动人口就业稳定性与劳动权益保护制度激励研究

Study on the Incentive of the Labor Rights Protection on the Employment Stability of Floating Population

我国拥有大规模的流动人口,大部分在城市第二、三产业中就业,其就业质量情况不佳,主要表现为:人力资本水平低、就业稳定性差、工作环境差、劳动权益保护不到位等。本文基于不完全契约理论中的GHM模型,在演化博弈视角下分析流动人口就业稳定性与劳动权益保护制度激励的关系,发现对于流动人口劳动权益制度保护对于流动人口就业稳定性有促进作用,同时通过佛山市南海区的实地调研数据进行了验证。

China has a large migrant population,mostly of them works in the second or third industry in the city. Their employ- ment quality is poor, mainly as follows ：low level of human capital is, poor employment stability, poor working environment, lack of labor rights protection etc.. This paper analyze the relationship between employment stability and incentive system of migrant population in the perspective of evolutionary game theory based on the GHM model of incomplete contract theory. And found that the labor right protection has tremendous simulative effect on the employment stability of migrant population. The paper also verified the conclusion through some investigation data in Nanhai district Foshan city.