摘要
研究了电子产品生产商委托零售商销售产品和回收电子废弃物的激励契约设计,考虑了零售商与个体电子废弃物回收者之间存在竞争关系,零售商在回收中具有自利行为,以及环保声誉等对激励契约的影响。研究发现,受环保声誉激励,生产商不提高销售业绩激励水平零售商依然保持较高的销售努力水平;当零售商自利的单位获利较高时,生产商不仅要提高对零售商的业绩激励水平,还要实施严格的监管和惩罚措施方能减少零售商的自利行为;当零售商自利的单位获利较小时,零售商依然有违规逐利的动机,高业绩激励不能减少零售商的自利行为,高惩罚或高监管可以更有效地控制零售商的自利行为;两个回收渠道的冲突激烈时,高业绩补贴可减少零售商的自利行为,否则,要综合考虑多要素,确定对零售商的业绩激励。
A optimal incentive contracts is formed for a producer commissioning a retailer to sell e- lectronic products and to collect e-wastes under asymmetrical information, which involves two differ- ent collecting channels that one is consisting of individual recyclers not authorized by government and the other is a retailer with self-interested behavior, and environmental reputation. The conclusions demonstrate that the retailer could raise the level of its sales efforts even its suppliers do not offer in- centive subsidies for its efforts in case the environmental reputation of retailer improving its product sales; When retailer's self-intersted behavior can receive more unit profit, the manufacture should im- prove the level of performance incentive for the retailer, and the implementation of strict supervision and punishment measures can reduce the retailer's self-interest behavior. When unit profit of retailer' s self-intersted behavior is small, the retailer still has illegal profit motives. Under the circumstances, the high performance incentive for retailer does not reduce its self-interest, but the high punishment or regulation can more effectively control its self-interest behavior. For channel intense competitiveness, increasing incentive subsidies for retailer take-back e-wastes can reduce self-interest motive, otherwise it is a must to synthesize multi-factor so as to determine the incentive subsidies.
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第2期285-294,共10页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71573086)
国家社会科学基金资助项目(10BGL063)
河南省教育厅科学技术重点研究资助项目(14A630004)
河南省高等学校哲学社会科学创新团队支持计划资助项目(2014-CXTD-10)
河南省高等学校哲学社会科学创新团队支持计划资助项目(2012-CXTD-07)
关键词
电子废弃物
零售商自利
渠道竞争
激励契约
e-waste
retailers
self-interest behavior
channel competition
incentive contract