科学实验与概念理解——基于科学实践的考察

Scientific Experiment and Conceptual Understanding—Based on the Study of Scientific Practice

概念理解的经验说明问题是哲学中的一大难题,科学实践哲学把研究该问题的着眼点从感觉经验转向了实验实践,表明概念理解并不仅仅是数学推理和语言表达的问题,实验系统在概念理解中发挥着基础性的作用,但相关研究对这种作用并没有给出清晰的说明。以科学史中对基因概念的理解为例对这种作用给出了进一步的说明:实验系统创造现象使得对新的概念的阐明是可进入的;实验系统开辟新的研究领域,为概念的阐明提供了方向和指导;实验系统为更进一步的概念的推理判断提供了空间和可能。

The question of how conceptual understanding is empirically accountable is a hard losophy. The philosophy of scientific practice shifts the focus of this issue from sensory experience practice, showing that the conceptual understanding is not just mathematical reasoning and language problem in phi- to experimental expression, the experimental systems plays a fundamental role in the understanding of the concept, but the relevant research on this effect does not give a clear explanation. Taking the understanding of gene concept in the history of science as an ex- ample, this paper gives further Explanation for this role ： 1 ） creating phenomenon of experimental systems is acces- sible to new concept; 2） experimental systems open up new areas of research, providing direction and guidance to clarify the concept; 3） experimental systems orovides the space and potential for further conceptual reasoning.