审计定价与“中签者之祸”及其思考

Thought on Audit Pricing and "Winner's Curse"

鉴于对低价进入式审计定价策略的关注,本论文评述了一个审计市场二阶段竞价模型。在这个模型中,审计成本包括两个部分:对所有可能的审计人员一致的共同审计成本和因具体审计人员而异的个别审计成本。正是由于这部分共同审计成本的存在,导致了“中签者之祸”情况的产生。论文认为,经验丰富的审计者通过改变审计竞价策略,以补偿“中签者之祸”带来的损失。这一点,对于“低价进入式竞价策略”(第一阶段审计价格的降低)的程度和审计人员的变更,起着重要的作用。在二阶段审计竞价模型中,“低价进入式竞价策略”与审计质量损失无关。基于上述分析框架,作者简要地陈述了我国审计服务市场的收费情况并做出了相关评论。

Focusing on 'low-balling' pricing, this paper reviews a two-period model of the audit market. The modal shows that the audit costs include both a component common to all potential auditors and a private component that varies across auditors. The common component of auditor costs gives rise to a scenario. The adjustment of bids by sophisticated auditors to compensate for the winner' s curse is shown to play a significant role in determining the degree of low-balling ( first-period price cuts ) and auditor turnover. In the model, low-balling is not associated with loss of audit quality. Following this analytical framework, the author briefly makes comments on audit pricing in China.