代理问题及其缓解机制——兼论会计信息及公司治理的作用

Agency Problem and Reducing Mechanisms: The Role of Accounting Information and Corporate Governance

股东和经理人之间代理问题形成的根源在于所有权与经营权的分离。由于经理人和股东在目标函数、风险偏好、期限视野上的不一致导致经理人的行为偏离股东的最优目标。缓解代理问题的机制包括公司内部的经理人报酬设计、公司治理结构安排,外部机制包括经理人市场、资本市场、公司控制权市场及产品市场的约束。文章还讨论了信息,尤其是会计信息在缓解代理问题中的作用。

The agency problems between shareholders and manager can find its root on the separation of ownership and management The manager's objective function, risk preference, horizon all depart from the shareholders' to some extent. These in turn lead the manager to sub-optimal behaviors. The mechanisms to reduce agency problems include management compensation design, corporate governance and the restrictions from management markets, capital markets, corporate control markets and product markets. Information, especially accounting information plays a vital role in these mechanisms.