盈余操纵行为监管的模型分析

Model Analysis to Supervision and Management of Earnings Manipulation Behavior

我国证券市场上存在严重的盈余操纵现象。其原因是多方面的,如由于政府在监管中的两难困境和多元化目标使其选择了利于上市公司进行盈余操纵的策略;法规的不健全,指标考核的单一加大了上市公司进行盈余操纵的动力,从而产生了“类逆向选择现象”。注册会计师审计不力也是一个重要的原因。本文运用博弈论建立模型,讨论了注册会计师审计和公司盈余操纵的关系并得出结论,以期形成良好的监管机制。

There are serious phenomena of earnings manipulation on the stock market in China. Its reasons are various. First, The dilemma of government in supervision and management and the diversified targets make the listed companies choose the strategies that are beneficial to their earning manipulation behavior. Second, the incomplete laws and single review mark enlarge the motivity that the listed companies manipulate earnings, and accordingly ' similar contrary choice phenomenon' comes into being. The inefficient CPA audit is another important reason. Based on the Game Theory, this essay builds a model and discusses about the relationship between CPA audit and earning manipulatioa Then, a conclusion is drawn that is expected to form a better mechanism of supervision and management and ensure good development of stock market.