上市公司自愿性信息披露行为动因的经济学分析

The Economic Analysis of Behavior Motivation of Voluntary Information Disclosure of Listed Firms

本文运用交易成本理论、有效市场理论、投资行为理论、比较优势理论、信号传递模型、声誉机制模型、“深口袋”理论、代理契约理论等为上市公司自愿性信息披露行为动因构建了一个理论解释框架,同时在管理当局与投资者之间进行了博弈分析,并得出结论:应大力倡导上市公司自愿性信息披露,构建以适度的强制性信息披露为主,自愿性信息披露作为重要补充的信息披露机制才是治理上市公司虚假信息披露的根本之策。

This paper applies Agent Contract Theory, Efficient Market Theory, Investment Behavior Theory, Comparative Advantage Theory, Signal Transmission Model, Reputation Mechanism Model, Transaction Cost Theory, 'the Deep Pocket' Theory and so on to make a theoretical explanation framework for behavior motivation of voluntary disclosure by listed companies, and makes a game analysis between management departments and investors. By analysis, We draw a conclusion that it is a fundamental strategy for governing false information disclosure by listed companies that we should encourage the listed companies to voluntary disclose, and make a information system which is based on proper dimension of compelled information disclosure, and take voluntary disclosure as supplementary information disclosure.