企业经营行为短期化的"桎梏"审视

Examination on the Confinement of Enterprise's Short-term Operation Behavior

现代企业的一个显著特征是所有权与经营权的分离,这种私有产权的分离和让渡使公司从指导对生产活动和技能的大规模专门化中获取了收益,但收益增加的同时也产生了一种特殊成本--代理成本。代理成本是由一系列代理问题所引起的企业实际收益与预期的偏差,因而代理问题成为公司治理的主要问题。本文讨论的经营行为短期化是代理问题的重要表现,直接影响到企业的长远发展,也被认为是公司制企业发展最为完善的美国各大企业近年来竞争力减弱的重要原因之一。

Nowadays, one of the characteristics for the enterprises is the separation from ownership to property, and such separation and transference of property make it possible for a corporation to derive profits through directing large-scale specialization in production and technical skills. However, during this process, a special cost-Agency cost occurs along with the increasing income. As the agency cost is a resultof the deviation between the actual income and the expectation caused by a series of agency problems. And such problems become dominant when it comes to corporate governance. This essay holds that the short-termized operational behavior has become typical in terms of agency problems, which has a direct effect upon the long-termed development for a corporation, also, this has been regarded as one of the important reasons why the competitiveness of the USA giants has been getting weak.