我国配股上市公司盈余操纵的实证研究——来自沪深股市的经验证据

An Empirical Study on Earnings Manipulation of Chinese Listed Companies Which Issuing New Shares to Old Stockholder

上市公司为了获得配股资格,极有可能操纵会计盈余,以达到规定的净资产收益率(ROE)。本文选取申请配股的上市公司为样本,对现有盈余管理(披露管理)模型的缺陷进行了修正。通过实证分析研究发现,ROE在配股资格线附近的申请配股的上市公司盈余操纵的程度比其他申请配股的上市公司要高,其在申请配股前的年份盈余操纵的程度比申请配股后的年份要高,而且主要是通过操纵资产减值、坏帐准备项目和经营性应收项目来实现盈余操纵的。

In order to obtain the qualification of issuing new shares to old stockholder, the listed companies will manipulate accounting earnings as possibly as they can to attain to the ruled ROE. This paper selects the listed company who had issued new shares to old stockholder as samples, and amends the model of earnings manipulate. Empirical evidence shows that the level of manipulating earnings by those listed companies whose ROE is near to 10% more highly than others; and shows that they manipulate earnings before the year of issuing new shares to old stockholder more highly than after that year; and shows that they manipulate earning by allowances for assets ,allowances for bad debts and operating accruals and so on items .