企业负债融资的控制权效率研究——基于不完全合同理论的分析框架

A Research on Control Right Efficiency of Enterprise Indebtedness Financing——A theory analysis based on imperfect contract

企业负债融资,是财务理论界一个"老生常谈"的话题。本文从控制权的角度,详细分析了企业负债融 资的期限和类型,对企业所有权,特别是控制权的配置效率和实现路径的影响,试图加深对这一领域的理论认识。

Enterprise indebtedness financing, a wheezy topic in financial theory. This research analyses terms and categories of Enterprise indebtedness financing from the point of view of control right and enterprise proprietorship, especially for the configuration efficiency of control right and the influence of implement path in detail, and then it tries to grow theory cognition in this field.