摘要
针对已有的基于计算Diffle-Hellman问题提出的无证书聚合签名方案构造了三种伪造攻击算法,攻击显示恶意但被动或者诚实但好奇的密钥生成中心均可伪造任意用户对任意消息的有效聚合签名,同时该方案也无法抵抗不诚实用户的合谋攻击。分析了原方案不安全的原因,通过在部分私钥生成阶段将用户公钥作为输入的参数,并在签名阶段将部分私钥与秘密值分别与不同的散列函数进行绑定,给出了高效的无需安全信道和双线性对的改进方案。改进方案的安全性可规约到更一般的离散对数困难问题。
Three forgery attack algorithms on the existing certificateless aggregate signature scheme using the intractability of computational Diffie-Hellman problem were presented. It was found that the "malicious-but-passive" or the "hon- est-but-curious" key generation center could forge a valid aggregate signature on any message on behalf of any user. The scheme also can not resist collusion attack by dishonest users. The reasons of insecurity of the original scheme were analyzed. By means of adding the user's public key as an input parameter in the stage of partial private key generation, and binding the partial private key and secret value to different Hash functions respectively in the stage of signature gen- eration, an improved scheme without secure channel and bilinear pairing was proposed. The security of the improved scheme can be reduced to the more general discrete logarithm problem.
出处
《山东大学学报(理学版)》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2015年第11期52-59,共8页
Journal of Shandong University(Natural Science)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(61170246)
福建省自然科学基金资助项目(2012J01295)
福建省中青年教师教育科研项目(JA15317)
关键词
无证书聚合签名
伪造攻击
安全信道
双线性对
离散对数问题
certificateless aggregate signature
forgery attack
secure channel
bilinear pairing
discrete logarithm problem