摘要
晋升锦标赛是理解中国地方政府官员推动经济增长的一个重要方面,在实际中官员通过政绩门槛后上级在具体选拔上有很大自由裁量权,这使关系有了空间。关系存在多维影响,好的方面可以成为贴近考察下级能力中无法量化部分的方式。官员进入队伍的开放和上级坚持选贤任能原则是正常资格赛的前提。门槛使晋升竞争存在,官员有动机去推动增长。此外,晋升锦标赛本质上是促使下级与上级保持一致的人事控制方式,除非中央事前明确肯定,否则地方官员不大可能基于晋升动机去主动推行市场改革,更多推动的是体制不变的增长,晋升锦标赛对以往地方改革动机的解释力是有限的。深化改革应着眼于顶层设计,中央以晋升锦标赛的控制方式全局性地推动改革。
The promotion competition is an important way to understand why the local officials promote economic growth in China. In fact there exists the threshold of the performance, a local official can be the candidate while exceeds the threshold, and who wins against other candidates would be determined by the higher authorities, so the personnel connection is important. Personnel relations have multi effects and good ones among them could be used to evaluate what cannot be quantified in official's capability. The premise of the promotion system is that the opening access of junior officials is kept and the higher authority insist on impartial judgment. The threshold makes the promotion system exist and the officials have incentives to push economic growth. In addition, the nature of promotion tournament is to make the subordinate keep loyalty to the superior. Unless the central authority permit something in advance, the locals can not take political risk to push forward the reform. So the central government should push the comprehensive reform by controlling the promotion competition.
出处
《经济与管理评论》
2016年第1期14-21,共8页
Review of Economy and Management
关键词
晋升锦标赛
晋升资格赛
地方政府
市场改革
Promotion tournament
Promotion qualification
Local government
Market transition