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基于相异边际成本的多个厂商动态古诺模型分析 被引量:3

A Dynamic Analysis of Cournot Model with Multi-Firms under Different Marginal Costs
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摘要 本文把两个厂商条件下的古诺模型拓广到更为一般情形,并进行动态分析,研究不同边际成本条件下多个寡头厂商的一般动态古诺模型。在给出一般动态古诺模型的数学表达式的基础上,列出各寡头厂商不同阶段的产量的表达公式,得出了各寡头厂商的均衡产量表达式,编程精确地实现了每一步动态博弈结果,并将不同条件下的动态博弈结果进行了比较,证明了成本对均衡产量的影响:边际成本对均衡产量有负的影响,边际成本小的厂商具有成本优势。 This paper generalizes the Cournot model with two firms to general dynamic Coumot model and carries out dy- namic analysis to study general dynamic Cournot model of multiple oligopoly firms under the condition of different margin- al costs. Given the mathematical expression of the general dynamic Cournot model, the paper lists the optimum yield ex- pression formula of each oligarchic firm, calculating the equilibrium output expression formula of each oligarchic firm, and then realizes the result of dynamic game step by step accurately by programming. Compared with the results of the dy- namic game under different conditions, it is found that the cost can affect the equilibrium output: marginal cost has a negative effect on equilibrium output, and companies with small marginal cost have cost advantages.
作者 高静
出处 《商业研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第2期13-19,共7页 Commercial Research
基金 上海财经大学研究生科研创新基金项目 项目编号:CXJJ-2012-392
关键词 边际成本 寡头厂商 动态古诺模型 marginal cost oligopoly firms dynamic Coumot model
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