可能经验也是先天综合判断的第三者吗?——评H.J.帕通对康德的一个误读

Is“the Possible Experience”also“the Third Thing”of Synthetic Judgment a Priori?——H.J.Paton's Misreading of Kant

康德在《纯粹理性批判》中明确提出了先天综合判断的第三者问题并对之做了相应的解答。H.J.帕通对此问题进行了自己的解读:首先,他指明了先天综合判断的第三者就是康德明确指认的由内感官、想象力和统觉这三项构成的一个条件总体;其次,他认为可能经验也是先天综合判断的第三者。于是,他将由内感官、想象力和统觉这三项构成的条件总体和可能经验等同起来了。研究表明:在康德那里,使先天综合判断得以可能的第三者只能是由内感官、想象力和统觉这三项构成的一个条件总体,其处于比可能经验更基础的层次上;该条件总体不仅是先天综合判断的可能性条件,也是先天综合判断之对象的可能性条件。帕通的解读混淆了两个不同层次上的概念,无形中扩大了第三者的外延,是对康德的一个重大误读。

In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant clearly raises the question of ＂the third thing＂ of synthetic judgment a priori, and accordingly answers to it. H.J.Paton interprets Kant＇s answer. Firstly, He points out clearly that Kant＇s ＂the third thing＂ is sum total which is composed of inner sense, imagination and apperception. Secondly, he also thinks the ＂the possible experience＂ is ＂the third thing＂ of synthetic judgment a priori. Hence, he equates the sum total which is composed of inner sense, imagination and apperception to ＂the possible experience＂. The study suggests that ＂the third thing＂ of synthetic judgment a priori is only the sum total which is composed of inner sense, imagination and apperception. It is at a more fundamental level than ＂the possible experience＂. ＂The third thing＂ is not only the condition for the possibility of experience, but also the condition for the object of experience. Paton confuses two concepts at different levels, and enlarges the concept of ＂the third thing＂＇, so it is a great misreading of Kant.