摘要
Relay attack is one of the most threatening challenges against radio frequency identification（RFID） now. Distance bounding protocols have been introduced to thwart relay attacks. They form a family of challenge-response authentication protocols and confirm the round-trip time at the Rapid Bit Exchange phase. They enable a reader to authenticate and to establish an upper bound on the physical distance to an entrusted tag. We design an effective attack against a family of such protocols to launch the spoofing attacks within effective distance successfully, which demonstrates that existing protocols cannot eliminate such attacks completely. The thesis proposes a new program with time- stamping verification to correct the defect and verify the effectiveness.
Relay attack is one of the most threatening challenges against radio frequency identification（RFID） now. Distance bounding protocols have been introduced to thwart relay attacks. They form a family of challenge-response authentication protocols and confirm the round-trip time at the Rapid Bit Exchange phase. They enable a reader to authenticate and to establish an upper bound on the physical distance to an entrusted tag. We design an effective attack against a family of such protocols to launch the spoofing attacks within effective distance successfully, which demonstrates that existing protocols cannot eliminate such attacks completely. The thesis proposes a new program with time- stamping verification to correct the defect and verify the effectiveness.
基金
Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(61332019)
