摘要
基于中国上市公司并购数据,本文研究发现高管过度自信对于2003-2014年间上市公司的并购数量、并购融资方式及并购中的多元化行为有较强解释力,而法律外制度的约束力与过度自信显著相关,且会进一步影响高管过度自信与公司并购行为间的关系。尽管并购在全国普遍存在,宗教影响力强的地区高管过度自信对企业并购行为的影响较弱,而低地方政府干预地区过度自信对企业并购行为的影响更强。
Based on the Merger & Acquisition Data from listed companies in China, we discover that for listed companies from 2003 to 2014, CEO overconfidence can strongly explain the number of M&A, the methods for M&A financing and the diversifying actions in M&A. Furthermore, the binding force of informal rules is significantly related to CEO overconfidence and it will influence the relationship between CEO overconfidence and companies' M&A behaviors. Even though M&A is popular over the whole country, in regions w ith stronger religious force, CEO has less influence on companies' M&A behaviors. But weaker intervention from local governments will strengthen the influence of CEO overconfidence on companies 'M&A behaviors.
出处
《浙江社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第1期36-44,156-157,共9页
Zhejiang Social Sciences
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(项目批准号:71202026)
对外经济贸易大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(项目批准号:13YQ09
CXTD5-03)对本项研究的资助
北京市社会科学基金研究基地项目(项目批准号:14JDJGA020)的资助
关键词
过度自信
并购
法律外制度
regional culture
overconfidence
M & A
informal rules